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Abstract:  Brazil has long been considered the archetype of “dependent development,” having 
served as the inspiration for the classic theory of the relationship between states and capital in the 
semi-peripheral states of the developing world. Since the theory of dependent development was 
initially formulated in the 1970s, however, both the Brazilian political economy and the global 
context in which it is situated have changed dramatically. In this paper, I revisit the Brazilian 
case in an effort to shed light on how state-business relations have been transformed in the 
contemporary era of globalization.  I show how the emergence of a highly-competitive export-
oriented agribusiness sector in Brazil has prompted the expansion and internationalization of 
domestic capital, leading to the emergence of an independent, private sector lobby with 
considerable influence on the Brazilian state. Driven by the rise of Brazilian agribusiness, the 
state and capital have allied together to aggressively pursue the expansion of markets for 
Brazilian exports, specifically through dispute settlement and negotiations at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
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Introduction 
In the 1970s, the case of Brazil drew considerable attention from scholars, inspiring the theory of 
“dependent development” and profoundly shaping our understanding of the relationship between 
states and capital in the semi-peripheral countries of the developing world. Yet, in the 
intervening years, both the Brazilian political economy and the global context in which it is 
situated have changed dramatically. Brazil has experienced a transition from dictatorship to 
democracy, major policy changes accompanying neoliberal market restructuring, and its 
emergence as a significant player in the global political economy. Concurrently, the world has 
undergone an intense period of economic globalization and the spread of market fundamentalist 
policies encapsulated in the “Washington Consensus.” The core-periphery relations elucidated 
by world-systems and dependency theorists are being restructured as the rise of large “emerging 
economies,” such as China, India and Brazil, challenges the dominance of the US and other 
states of the Global North.  
In this paper, I return to the Brazilian case several decades after the theory of dependent 
development was first formulated in order to highlight important changes in the nature of state-
business relations in the contemporary era of globalization. I demonstrate that the emergence of a 
highly-competitive export-oriented agribusiness sector in Brazil has prompted the expansion and 
internationalization of domestic capital, creating an independent, private sector lobby with 
considerable influence on the Brazilian state. Driven by the rise of Brazilian agribusiness, the 
state and capital have allied together to aggressively pursue the expansion of markets for 
Brazilian exports, through World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement and 
negotiations. This analysis draws on 15 months of field research conducted in Sao Paulo, 
Brasilia, Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington, as well as at the WTO in Geneva, involving 157 
interviews with senior government officials, trade negotiators, and representatives of industry 
and non-governmental organizations; ethnographic observation; and extensive documentary 
research.  
 
Theorizing state-business relations in Brazil 
The theory of dependent development has provided a central framework for understanding state-
business relations in semi-peripheral countries such as Brazil. It emerged as a critique of classic 
dependency theory, which saw the prospects for Third World countries to develop as blocked by 
their dependence on the export of low-value primary products (such as raw materials and 
agricultural goods) to the core countries of the capitalist global economy (Prebisch, 1962; Frank, 
1966). The theory of dependent development sought to account for important changes in the 
global economy that had occurred during the 1950s and 60s: the emergence of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) increasingly investing in manufacturing industry in the periphery and the 
partial success of some developing countries in fostering industrialization through the use of 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies (Harriss, 2009; Munck, 2009; Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979; Heller et al., 2009). Dependent development broke with traditional dependency 
theory by arguing that – for at least a subset of Third World countries (the more advanced, or 
semi-peripheral, countries) – development through industrialization was possible even under 
conditions of dependency. Such development remained “dependent” due to its heavy reliance on 
capital supplied by foreign multinationals originating in core countries. This dependence on 
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foreign capital made possible, but also constrained and distorted, patterns of national 
development (Gereffi and Fonda, 1992).  
Brazil was widely seen as the paradigmatic case of dependent development (Evans, 1995, p. 11). 
The export of agricultural commodities played a central role in Brazil’s early economic history, 
dating back to the colonial era. Well into the early decades of the twentieth century, the Brazilian 
economy centered on the export of coffee and rubber to Europe and the US. It was a situation of 
classic dependency, with Brazil reliant on the export of cheap primary products and the import of 
more expensive manufactured goods (Cardoso, 1972). Concerned about its dependence on 
primary product exports in the context of declining terms of trade, Brazil – like many developing 
countries – embarked upon import-substitution policies designed to foster the development of 
national industry. In Brazil, this began as early as the 1930s and accelerated in the 1950s-60s 
(Evans, 1979). As Gereffi (1989, p. 514) states, 
“the deterioration of the terms of trade for agricultural exports began in the 1920s, reflecting 
falling demand and rising supplies of agricultural goods throughout the industrialized nations, 
and the adoption of protectionism in many countries of Continental Europe. This led to the 
demise of the primary product export model and served as an incentive for import-substituting 
industrialization.” 
Brazil’s ISI policies succeeded in increasing manufacturing and fostering economic 
development, but relied heavily on MNCs and foreign direct investment (FDI) from the core 
countries of the Global North. Industrialization was rooted primarily in production for its large 
domestic market, which served to attract foreign corporations and investment. The resulting 
development, however, was “indelibly marked by the effects of continued dependence on capital 
housed in the core countries” (Gereffi and Evans, 1981, p. 32). At the center of the dependent 
development model was the relationship between the state and capital, specifically the 
interaction among the state, multinational corporations, and national business elites in driving 
national development through industrialization. In his classic study of dependent development in 
Brazil, Evans (1979) posited a “triple alliance” of the state, multinational and local capital. The 
relationship among these actors was characterized by both conflict and cooperation. Conflict 
among the interests of transnational capital, local capital and the state over local development 
priorities – and with the state subject to other competing interests and pressures – meant that 
there was not always complete accord within this alliance. Nevertheless their concurrent interests 
in economic development and profitability made industrialization a shared objective and 
provided incentives for cooperation. The primary challenge for the state was to attract and 
manage foreign multinational corporations and capital in order to fuel the project of national 
development through industrialization. The state approached the economy with an attitude of 
“conscious interventionism” (Evans, 1979, p. 86). It played a heavy role in managing the 
economy, including through state-sponsored industrialization projects, state-owned enterprises, 
market regulation, and foreign trade and investment restrictions. The state also funded and 
controlled industry associations and unions. State-capital relations in the domestic sphere were 
characterized by corporatism, which rendered local capital the weakest party in the triad, largely 
controlled by and subservient to a strong, interventionist state.  
Analyzing the contemporary case of Brazil, I argue that while alliances between the state and 
capital continue to be significant in Brazil’s development model, they have been transformed in 
the era of globalization. During the period of ISI, the key driver of economic change was foreign 
capital, seeking access to the domestic market, whose activities the state sought to control and 
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discipline in order to foster national development. The most important actors in the alliance were 
the state and foreign capital and the basis for their alliance centered on the domestic market. 
Now, however, driven by rapid and sustained export-led growth in the agro-industrial sector, 
local capital has expanded dramatically. Brazilian capital has been internationalized, producing 
primarily for export markets and engaged in extensive trade, investment and production activities 
abroad. It has also emerged as a major force in shaping Brazilian politics and policy. Previously, 
the focus of the state was on fostering the domestic manufacturing industry, which was seen as 
the primary engine of economic development; now, significant emphasis has shifted to fostering 
agro-industry, which has become a major source of growth and export revenue. Brazilian capital, 
which was once the weakest party in the triad, has become its leader. The central alliance is now 
between the state and domestic capital, working together to expand exports. A central focus of 
their efforts has been in seeking to use WTO negotiations and dispute settlement to liberalize 
global agricultural trade. 
Figure 1 traces the significant changes that have occurred in state-business relations in Brazil 
over the last two decades. As Brazil has developed a highly-competitive and sophisticated agro-
industrial export sector, domestic capital has expanded and become internationalized; an 
independent, private sector lobby has developed, with considerable influence on the Brazilian 
state; and a state-business alliance has emerged in pursuit of the expansion of export 
opportunities. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In the last decade, Brazil has become an increasingly aggressive and prominent actor at the 
WTO, the international institution responsible for setting and enforcing the rules of the 
international trading system (Hurrell and Narlikar, 2006; Schott, 2009; Lee and Wilkinson, 2007; 
Hopewell, 2013). However, in seeking to understand Brazil’s changing position at the WTO, 
existing accounts of trade policy formulation in Brazil – rooted in the traditional conception of 
state-business relations – have stressed the isolation of the Brazilian state. These accounts 
contend that it determines such policy with little influence from domestic interest groups who 
have only limited access points through which to engage with the state and are largely co-opted. 
Hurrell and Narlikar (2006), for example, de-emphasize the importance of domestic politics in 
driving Brazil’s trade policy; instead, they argue that Brazil’s behavior at the WTO should be 
understood as driven primarily by international-level factors and its interaction with other states. 
They contend that consultation with interest groups in Brazil is limited and selective and often 
serves merely as a device to legitimize the policy and negotiation positions that the government 
has adopted internationally. Botto (2010: 68) makes a similar argument that “input from the 
private sector faces serious obstacles in reaching decision makers.” While this may accurately 
reflect and describe the traditional way of formulating trade (and other) policy in Brazil, I argue 
that it fails to capture the significant change that has occurred in Brazilian policymaking. The 
booming agribusiness sector – a key source of dynamism in the Brazilian economy – interacts 
with the government in a fundamentally different way than our old model for understanding 
state-business interaction in Brazil would predict. In the last two decades, Brazilian agribusiness 
has emerged as a key driver of Brazilian trade policy and its negotiating position at the WTO. 
 
Brazil’s emergence as an agro-industrial powerhouse 
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Changes in the global political economy over the last several decades – including economic 
globalization, neoliberal restructuring, and the liberalization of global markets – have had a 
dramatic impact on the Brazilian economy and its development strategy. Brazil’s ISI policies 
were generally successful in fostering industrialization and economic growth and development. 
However, by the 1980s – like many developing countries – Brazil was confronted with a 
profound economic crisis involving severe balance of payments problems, hyperinflation and the 
Third World debt crisis. Policymakers determined that the old model of an inward-looking 
economy with substantial state intervention to promote industrial development was no longer 
sustainable and embarked on a major program of neoliberal economic restructuring, which 
included stabilizing the macroeconomic environment, removing state intervention from markets, 
and opening the economy to foreign trade and investment. Brazil also went through equally 
momentous changes in its political system, with the transition from military rule to democracy in 
1985. 
Historically, Brazil’s agricultural sector was based primarily on large plantations producing 
tropical products for export, small family farms supplying the domestic market, and peasants 
engaged in subsistence production. Due to the success of Brazil’s ISI policies, over much of the 
twentieth century the importance of agriculture in the national economy declined as that of 
manufacturing increased. However, in recent decades, the combination of liberalization and 
technological innovation transformed Brazil’s agricultural sector, prompting the emergence of a 
large-scale and highly competitive agribusiness sector. The foundation for this transformation 
was laid in the 1970s, with substantial public and private investment – driven by Japanese 
financing and the Brazilian government’s federal agricultural research institute, EMBRAPA – in 
research to adapt temperate crops (such as soybeans) to Brazil’s tropical climate and soils 
(Goldsmith and Hirsch, 2006). A temporary US embargo on its own agricultural exports in the 
early 1970s threatened global supply and gave impetus to efforts to develop production of these 
commodities in Brazil (Wilkinson, 2009). This technological innovation enabled Brazil to move 
away from the tropical products typically exported by developing countries (coffee, tea, sugar, 
bananas, etc.) to producing and exporting commodities (soybeans, cotton, corn, beef, chicken, 
pork, etc.) that directly compete with those of the world’s dominant agricultural producers – the 
US, EU, and other countries of the Global North. Rapid expansion and restructuring of Brazil’s 
agricultural sector took off with the economic reform policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Economic 
policy during the ISI period had involved significant state intervention in agricultural markets. 
Brazil’s economic liberalization program entailed many changes directed specifically at the 
agricultural sector, including eliminating government purchases, marketing boards and minimum 
support prices; privatizing state enterprises; reducing subsidies; and eliminating foreign trade 
restrictions (domestic and export taxes, other restrictions on agricultural exports, and import 
licenses) and barriers to foreign investment.  
The market-oriented policies Brazil introduced ushered in rapid export-led growth in the 
agricultural sector, driven by massive investment and consolidation. In just a four year period, 
from 2000-2004, total planted area grew by an area larger than the size of Italy or Vietnam 
(ICONE, 2006). Exports grew at rates as high as 20 percent per year (Valdes, 2006). This was 
driven by the expansion of corporate farming, including the emergence of “mega farms” – large, 
professionally managed corporate farm groups benefitting from economies of scale, many with 
planted areas in excess of 1 million hectares. Although Brazil is blessed with favorable natural 
resource endowments (including an abundance of arable land and water and a climate that allows 
for two harvests per year), the transformation of Brazilian agriculture has been driven by 
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substantial research and development and resulting technological advance, which opened up 
sizeable new areas of the country to non-traditional crops and made possible significant gains in 
yields and productivity. The agro-industrial sector is highly sophisticated, based on mechanized, 
capital-intensive, vertically-integrated production.  
Brazil has emerged as an agro-industrial powerhouse: it is one of the most competitive 
agricultural producers in the world and the leading exporter of a large and growing number of 
products (see Table 1). Brazil is now the third largest agricultural exporter, after the US and EU, 
and the country with the largest agricultural trade surplus. Its exports are expected to continue to 
expand rapidly over the next decade and beyond. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Although Brazil’s agricultural boom is based on exports, it is not simply dependent on the 
markets of the old core of advanced-industrialized countries. Instead, Brazil’s exports are spread 
across a large range of countries and regions and increasingly concentrated in the developing 
world. In the last several decades, Brazil faced significant trade barriers in the US and EU for 
many of its key export products (such as orange juice and beef in the US and poultry in the EU). 
To get around these barriers, Brazilian agribusiness firms used a strategy of acquiring foreign 
competitors and locating some of their production in these markets (EIU, 2010). They also 
diversified their export markets, a process facilitated by the dramatic expansion of demand for 
agricultural products in rapidly growing parts of the developing world. Developed countries were 
once the main destinations for Brazilian agricultural products, but since 2004 most of its 
agricultural exports have been destined for developing countries and other non-traditional export 
destinations (Damico and Nassar, 2007). China is now the largest market for Brazilian 
agribusiness products (EIU, 2010). In the words of one Brazilian negotiator at the WTO:  
“Brazil is a truly global exporter, not tied to any particular region or market. More than half our 
exports are South-South trade and we expect markets in Asia and Africa to represent the future 
for Brazilian exporters. We think this trade has a lot of growth potential – many of these 
countries are already net food importers and have limited natural resources to produce their own 
agricultural products. The more these countries get richer – like China, India – the more they will 
need our exports, particularly meat.”[1] 
In developing countries, more and better food is one of the first demands from consumers as 
incomes rise. While the US and EU are mature markets with limited potential for growth, rapid 
income growth in the developing world is driving an explosion of demand for Brazil’s 
agricultural products and Brazil’s trade is now heavily oriented towards these countries. 
Far from being dependent on the US and EU markets, Brazil now competes with the US and EU 
in such third country markets. In fact, Brazil is in direct competition with the US and EU for 
most of its key agricultural exports (USDA, 2009).  
 
Expansion and internationalization of Brazilian capital 
The growth of Brazil’s agro-industrial export sector has fueled a dramatic expansion and 
internationalization of “local” capital. Liberalization prompted a large inflow of foreign 
investment and increase in the presence of foreign MNCs – including US and EU based firms 
such as Cargill and Bunge, as well as firms from neighboring Argentina – which helped propel 
the initial growth of the sector (Jank et al., 2001). Foreign MNCs continue to have a significant 
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presence in Brazil’s agricultural sector, as they do nearly all over the world. However, in the last 
two decades, there has been a dramatic expansion of Brazilian firms. Of the 40 leading 
agribusiness companies operating in Brazil, 35 are Brazilian in origin.[2] There are now 
approximately 20 agribusiness companies in Brazil with annual sales of more than US$1bn and 
others are poised to soon reach this level (EIU, 2010). Brazilian firms have also diversified their 
activities and moved up the value chain into higher value-added activities, such as trading, 
processing, transport, and energy production (biofuels).  
Many Brazilian companies have transformed themselves into multinational players, through 
aggressive campaigns of outward foreign investment and acquisitions (EIU, 2010). One of 
Brazil’s leading firms, JBS, has become the world’s largest beef processor and among the largest 
poultry and pork processors, with operations in all of the world’s major markets and global 
revenues of US$17bn. It has acquired some of the largest agrifood companies in the US, Europe 
and elsewhere, including: Swift & Company, one of the largest beef and pork processors in the 
US; 50 percent of Inalca, one of Europe’s biggest beef-producing companies; Swift Armour, 
Argentina’s largest beef producer and exporter; and Pilgrim’s Pride, the largest chicken producer 
in the US. Brasil Foods is now one of the largest frozen food producers in the world, with a 
presence in over 110 countries. The recent merger of two Brazilian firms, Citrosuco and 
Citrovita, created the world’s largest orange juice producer, with production facilities in both 
Brazil and the US and port terminals in North America, Asia and Europe. Similarly, Brazilian 
firms are leaders in the sugar/ethanol sectors and are investing aggressively in production in 
Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa (Wilkinson, 2009). Brazilian business actors have 
sought to capture the benefits of globalization by transnationalizing their activities. Brazilian 
“local” capital has thus become internationalized: Brazilian firms have become global actors, 
producing for foreign markets and engaged in extensive activities abroad, including investment, 
joint-ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and foreign production. 
 
Development of an independent agribusiness lobby 
The emergence of a sophisticated and aggressive export-oriented agribusiness sector transformed 
the relationship between the state and business. At the same time, it also significantly altered 
Brazil’s trade policies and orientation towards international trade negotiations. Prior to 
liberalization, Brazil’s old dirigiste economy had a strongly protectionist orientation. Trade 
policy was essential to Brazil’s ISI policies, but it was inward-looking and centered on protecting 
domestic industries against foreign competition from imports. During this period, Brazil played 
only a relatively minor role in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
predecessor to the WTO. Brazil did not assume a role of demandeur in the trade regime; its 
involvement in the negotiation of specific issues was limited and its concerns were primarily 
defensive, seeking to delay or block the expansion of trade rules (de Lima and Hirst, 2006). 
Brazil’s international trade and economic policymaking was highly centralized, with authority 
concentrated in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) which had a high degree of autonomy 
from domestic social forces (Shaffer et al., 2008; Veiga, 2007). This was compounded by the 
fact that from 1964 to 1985, Brazil was an authoritarian state under military rule: as Evans (1979, 
p.: 265) states, “one of the military’s aims was to ‘abolish politics,’ which in practice meant 
eliminating popular input into the political process.” Economic policy instruments were under 
the control of a strong techno-bureaucracy and government-business relations were generally 
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non-transparent (Veiga, 2002). At this time, Brazilian industry was primarily focused on the 
domestic market. Since GATT did not pose a significant risk to Brazil’s ISI policies, industry 
had little reason to be concerned. Overall, the private sector’s role was relatively passive and it 
had little engagement in trade policy formulation: it did not coordinate to lobby the government 
regarding the GATT and rarely participated in the definition of Brazil’s negotiating position 
(Veiga, 2002). 
This changed as Brazil moved to an economic model centered on export growth and its 
development orientation shifted outward. While Brazil’s trade policy had been primarily 
determined unilaterally in the past, external trade negotiations took on greater importance in the 
1990s with the establishment of Mercosur in 1991 (a regional trade agreement designed to create 
a common market), the beginning of negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
in 1994, and the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Within the Brazilian state, other ministries 
became increasingly involved in trade negotiations as they broadened in scope to include 
important issues of domestic policy (Shaffer et al., 2008). The private sector also began to devote 
more attention to trade policy. Brazil’s ISI policies had created sectors that benefited from the 
old regime of trade protection and were threatened by the prospect of liberalization. In the early 
1990s, these import-competing sectors managed to maintain primacy in trade policy: a 
“protectionist block” dominated the expression of private sector interest in trade policymaking 
and Brazil maintained a primarily defensive posture in trade negotiations (Veiga, 2007). 
However, as economic reforms took hold and the agro-export sector expanded, the scales began 
to tilt in its favor. 
The political participation of agribusiness grew significantly in the late 1990s. Under the old 
corporatist structure of state-business relations, the major business associations were officially 
sanctioned, funded, and supervised by the state, preventing the emergence of strong business 
lobby associations (Marques, 2008). Now, the burgeoning agro-export sector began to develop 
its own independent associations, by-passing the old corporatist structures, to articulate their 
interests and influence policymaking (Marques, 2008). Agribusiness lobbying in Brazil 
organized both along sectoral lines (e.g., sugar, beef), as well as in broader cross-sectoral 
associations (e.g., Brazilian Agribusiness Association). Brazilian agribusiness grew increasingly 
interested in trade policy and began pressing the state to take more aggressive positions in 
international trade negotiations in order to expand markets for Brazil’s exports.  
The agribusiness sector also has close ties to the state. Agribusiness interests hold considerable 
sway in the national legislature and many senior-level government appointments are filled by 
representatives of the agro-industrial sector.[3] Agribusiness had a significant presence in Lula’s 
cabinet. For example, the Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade in his first 
administration, Luiz Fernando Furlan, was previously Chair of Sadia, one of Brazil’s biggest 
poultry producers, and President of two major industry lobby groups, the Brazilian Chicken 
Exporters Association (ABEF) and the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Manufacturers 
(ABIOVE). Similarly, the Minister of Agriculture, Roberto Rodrigues, came from heading the 
Brazilian Agribusiness Association (ABAG) and the Brazilian Rural Society (Sociedade Rural 
Brasileira). Likewise, under Cardoso, the key official within the government leading the charge 
to launch the cotton and sugar cases at the WTO described below, Pedro de Camargo Neto, was 
formerly head of the Brazilian Rural Society (Sociedade Rural Brasileira), which lobbies on 
behalf of agribusiness. There is also close collaboration between agribusiness representatives and 
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government officials, including the co-authoring of books and articles (e.g., Damico and Nassar, 
2007; Thorstensen and Jank, 2005), reflecting their shared beliefs and orientation.[4]  
 
Economic and trade policy 
When President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT) came to power 
in 2002, there were expectations of a potential shift away from neoliberalism, but the Lula 
government in fact continued the economic and trade policies of its predecessors. This included 
privileging agribusiness expansion, based on the notion that Brazil must “export or die,” first 
articulated by Cardoso, Lula’s immediate predecessor and the major architect of its liberalization 
program (Karriem, 2009). Agribusiness contributes 28 percent of GDP and is considered an 
important engine of growth in the Brazilian economy (Valdes, 2006; Damico and Nassar, 2007). 
Agribusiness exports are also seen as a central means of generating foreign exchange and 
avoiding the balance-of-payments problems that historically plagued the country: they are 
responsible for over 40 percent of exports and 97 percent of the country’s balance of trade 
surplus (OECD, 2009). As one Brazilian trade official stated, “my sympathies are with 
agribusiness. Just look at the figures – my macro stability depends on agribusiness.”[5]  
There is, however, another side to Brazilian agriculture. While agribusiness is responsible for 
most of Brazil’s agricultural production (75 percent) and nearly all of its exports, the vast 
majority of the country’s farmers (85 percent) are less competitive, small-scale family farmers 
and subsistence producers (MDA, 2009), for whom the expansion of agribusiness poses a 
significant threat. Land distribution in Brazil has historically been among the most unequal in the 
world; this has been exacerbated by economic liberalization and the industrialization of 
agriculture, which have increased the concentration of land holdings and resulted in the 
displacement of small landholders and workers. The Brazilian Landless Workers Movement 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST) – a social movement pursuing agrarian 
reform by mobilizing landless peasants to occupy land since the late-1970s – has been a key 
force of opposition to agricultural liberalization and neoliberalism (Karriem, 2009).  
The dualistic structure of Brazilian agriculture is reflected in government policymaking: Brazil is 
likely the only country in the world with two agriculture ministries. The Ministry of Agriculture 
(Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento, MAPA) formulates and implements 
policies to promote the development of the large-scale, industrial, export-oriented agribusiness 
sector, while a separate Ministry of Agrarian Development (Ministério do Desenvolvimento 
Agrário, MDA) was established in 2000 to alleviate rural poverty by administering welfare-
oriented policies and support programs (such as price supports and subsidized credit) directed at 
small-scale farmers, subsistence producers, rural workers, and landless settlements (OECD, 
2009). Likewise, the different sets of interests are reflected by two separate lobbying 
organizations: the National Agricultural Federation (Confederação Nacional da Agricultura, 
CNA) representing commercial and large farmers, and the National Federation of Rural Workers 
(Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores Rurais, CONTAG) representing small farmers and 
workers. In Brazilian policy making, industrialized agriculture and small-scale farming are 
treated as two separate tracks. But, of the two, it is agro-industry that is given primacy; the 
relative weight of the two sectors in Brazilian policy is evident in the fact that MAPA’s budget is 
nearly double that of MDAs (despite the fact it serves only 15 percent of producers).[6] The 
weight of MAPA is particularly strong in determining trade policy; this is illustrated, for 
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example, in the size of its staff devoted to trade issues, which dwarfs that of MDA (MAPA has 
approximately eighty professionals working on trade, compared to MDA’s ten). Within the 
Brazilian state, small-scale farming and subsistence production are generally seen as a 
backwards and declining sector – and primarily as a target for social protection and welfare 
programs – while agro-industry is viewed as a dynamic sector and a key source of growth and 
prosperity.[7]  
Since Lula, the Brazilian government’s strategy has been to pursue neoliberal economic policies 
and export-led growth, accompanied by social welfare policies and redistribution to improve 
conditions of the lowest strata of society. During this period, the Brazilian economy has grown 
rapidly, along with falling unemployment, rising wages, and a growing middle class (Lapper, 
2010). The Lula government expanded welfare policies through programs such as the Bolsa 
Familia, an income transfer to poor households, and Zero Hunger (Fome Zero), a program to 
combat food insecurity and extreme poverty. These programs have managed to reduce poverty 
rates, especially rates of extreme poverty, as well as inequality (Soares et al., 2007). In 
agriculture, the dual-track of Brazilian policy has meant a primary focus on expanding 
agribusiness exports, occurring alongside efforts to assist the family farming sector and an 
expanded land reform program to settle landless peasants, although these have fallen far below 
the expectations of the MST and failed to halt the increasing concentration of land (Frayssinet, 
2009). Economic growth, combined with expanded social welfare policies, has created a degree 
of social consensus around the government’s economic and trade policies, including its 
promotion of agribusiness and export-led growth – evident in 80 percent approval ratings for 
Lula (Colitt, 2010) and re-election of the PT under his successor, Dilma Rousseff, in 2010. 
Despite criticism from some social movements such as the MST about Brazil’s intensive agro-
industrial model (Rodrigues, 2009; MST, 2009), such concerns have not substantially disrupted 
the direction of its agricultural or trade policy. 
 
The state-business alliance to expand exports 
The Brazilian state and agribusiness have allied together to push for global agricultural trade 
liberalization in order to expand markets for Brazil’s exports. Their objective is to improve 
access to foreign markets by lowering tariffs and reducing agricultural subsidies in countries 
such as the US and EU, which depress world prices and impede the growth of Brazil’s exports. 
With both the FTAA and EU-Mercosur trade negotiations stalled, the WTO became the priority 
for agribusiness. Agribusiness had been frustrated with the results of the previous Uruguay 
Round (1986-94) of WTO trade negotiations – which had promised much but ultimately 
delivered little liberalization in agriculture – and saw the current Doha Round as an opportunity 
to aggressively start reducing trade barriers and other market distortions. Brazilian producers 
believe that by liberalizing trade and reducing rich country subsidies, Brazil could surpass the 
US as the world’s leading agricultural exporter (Rohter, 2005). This view is shared by officials:  
“Structural changes in the world trading system really can provide Brazil with great 
opportunities in the future. The WTO negotiations are important because we will probably be 
displacing the big guys in the global market. That’s why we have been pushing so hard on the 
Doha Round and why we are the major developing country user of the dispute settlement 
system.”[8] 
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The pro-free trade stance of Brazilian agribusiness is not shared equally by other sectors of 
society. Many NGOs, trade unions, social movements, and groups representing small farmers 
and peasants, including CONSEA, CONTAG, the Brazilian Network for the Integration of 
Peoples (Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos, REBRIP), and the MST, opposed the 
launch of a new round of WTO negotiations and have argued that Brazil should resist the 
expansion of trade liberalization at the WTO (Veiga, 2007). In addition, Brazil has other 
economic sectors that are threatened by foreign competition (including many manufacturing 
sectors, such as electronics, textiles and clothing, shoes, chemicals, and automobiles). Many of 
these sectors have already suffered significant damage from imports – particularly from China – 
and are concerned about the potential impacts of further liberalization. But in determining 
Brazil’s trade policy and its negotiating position at the WTO, the concerns of its defensive 
sectors have been largely outweighed by the potential benefits of liberalization for the agro-
export sector and Brazil has demonstrated a willingness to make concessions in these areas in 
order to secure benefits for its agricultural exports (Veiga, 2007). Brazil has defined its primary 
strategic interest as seeking further agricultural trade liberalization and opening foreign markets 
to its exports.[9] Brazil is seen as one of the biggest potential winners from the Doha Round and 
has been one of its most active and vocal supporters.[10]  
Despite the undeniable influence of non-state actors – including the private sector, NGOs, and 
trade lawyers and experts – the WTO remains an inter-state forum, with negotiations and dispute 
settlement operating on a state-to-state basis. Brazilian agribusiness has therefore needed to work 
closely with the Brazilian state to advance its interests at the WTO. Agribusiness has emerged as 
a powerful force in Brazilian politics with considerable influence in shaping government policy, 
particularly in the realm of trade. But this is more complicated than simply a case of the state 
being captured by a powerful domestic interest group; the Brazilian state is not merely an 
instrument controlled by agribusiness. Instead, the relationship between the state and 
agribusiness is better understood as an alliance or partnership, involving a conscious alignment 
of the Brazilian state with agribusiness, based on shared interests and ideology. The position of 
the state accords with Evan’s (1995) concept of “embedded autonomy” – it is both autonomous 
and embedded in dense ties to important actors in the private sector. In the realm of foreign and 
trade policy, Brazil has a highly capable and effective state bureaucracy, which has a degree of 
independence and autonomy from domestic social forces but also close ties to agribusiness. 
Given the importance of agribusiness exports to the Brazilian economy, expanding exports is a 
shared objective of both the state and agribusiness, which provides the basis for their alliance in 
pursuit of agricultural trade liberalization at the WTO. 
Brazil consequently adopted an aggressive position at the WTO, seeking to make use of both the 
WTO’s strong dispute settlement mechanism and the Doha Round negotiations to advance the 
commercial interests of its agribusiness sector. As described above, Brazil’s agricultural export 
markets are increasingly concentrated in the developing world, which represent its key source of 
future demand growth; in these markets it competes heavily with subsidized agricultural products 
produced by the US, EU and other developed countries. Brazil determined its primary objective 
is to reduce the subsidies provided by the US and EU to their agricultural producers and thereby 
improve its competitive position vis-à-vis those countries in global markets. Working together in 
close partnership, Brazilian agribusiness and the state successfully waged two landmark trade 
disputes against the US and EU – the cotton and sugar cases – and mobilized a coalition of 
developing countries – the Group of 20 (G20) – to challenge developed country agricultural 
subsidies.  
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 WTO Dispute Settlement 
Historically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled Brazil’s approach to GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement and generally received little proactive input from the Brazilian private sector (Shaffer 
et al., 2008). However, in the late 1990s-early 2000s, two prominent cases launched against 
Brazil under the new Uruguay Round rules and dispute settlement system – a Canadian challenge 
to Brazilian aircraft subsidies and a US complaint regarding Brazil’s intellectual property law in 
the area of pharmaceuticals – drew unprecedented public attention to the WTO in Brazil and 
raised awareness among its business sector of the power of WTO dispute settlement.[11] 
Brazilian agribusiness became eager to use the WTO dispute settlement system to challenge the 
agricultural policies of the US and EU. Initially, the agribusiness sector pressed the Brazilian 
government to initiate a case against US subsidies to soybeans, one of the most significant export 
commodities for Brazil. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) resisted, 
concerned about the complexities and financial costs associated with such a case, the risk 
involved in challenging the US, and the potential political fallout if Brazil were to lose.[12] 
During the delay caused by Itamaraty, market fluctuations eliminated the technical basis for the 
case (a rise in soy prices caused US subsidies to fall). Ultimately, under pressure from the 
agribusiness sector and its representatives in the Ministry of Agriculture, Brazil decided to target 
US cotton subsidies. The implications of this move went beyond cotton, as through the cotton 
case, Brazil was able to challenge a broad range of general support programs that cover not only 
cotton but several other commodities, including soybeans and corn (Chaddad and Jank, 2006). 
Brazil also decided to concurrently launch a case against the EU on sugar, in an effort to disarm 
potential criticism that it was targeting the US for ideological or political reasons and to show 
that it was taking a stand against agricultural subsidies in general.  
Brazil launched the two landmark dispute settlement cases against US cotton subsidies and EU 
sugar export subsidies in September 2002. The cotton and sugar agribusiness associations, 
ABRAPA and UNICA, financed the cases and provided legal counsel. Brazil won both cases in 
2005 and their impact was profound. They marked the first time that a developing country had 
successfully challenged developed country agricultural subsidies. As a result, the EU was forced 
to reform its sugar support programs to eliminate the offending export subsidies. The US 
eliminated its most egregious cotton subsidies and was required to pay Brazilian farmers $147 
million per year until it fully reforms its cotton subsidy programs in the next farm bill; should it 
fail to do so, Brazil was granted the right to impose over $800 million in retaliatory trade 
sanctions against US goods, pharmaceuticals, and software. Moreover, Brazil’s victories were of 
broader significance beyond the specific commodities they addressed, as they revealed major 
inconsistencies between US and EU agriculture policies and WTO rules. As one report to US 
Congress stated, “a review of current US farm programs measured against these criteria suggests 
that all major US program crops are potentially vulnerable to WTO challenges.”(CRS 2006: ii) 
Brazil’s success in the disputes demonstrated the vulnerability of developed country farm 
programs and raised the prospect that they could be subject to a wave of future WTO dispute 
settlement challenges.  
 
Doha Round Negotiations 
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In addition to dispute settlement, the Brazilian state and agribusiness have also actively 
collaborated to use the Doha Round negotiations to expand markets for Brazil’s exports. Over 
the last decade, the Brazilian government invested heavily in enhancing its staff and resources 
dedicated to WTO trade negotiations and dispute settlement. It now has one of the largest 
delegations in Geneva, supported by an army of highly trained and specialized trade officials in 
Brasilia, and its negotiating team is widely recognized as among the most skilled, active and 
knowledgeable at the WTO.[13] Brazil mobilized and led a coalition of developing countries – 
the G20 – to press for agricultural liberalization from the developed countries, particularly on 
subsidies, which has had a profound impact on the Doha Round. Brazil was the driving force 
behind the G20, and in turn, its agribusiness sector played a powerful and influential role behind 
Brazil’s negotiating team and strategy in Geneva. 
Determined to make significant gains in the Doha Round, in early 2003, Brazil’s major 
agribusiness associations invested in creating a specialized trade policy institute, the Institute for 
International Trade Negotiations (ICONE), dedicated to producing sophisticated technical work 
to support the Brazilian government in the negotiations.[14] The Brazilian government relied on 
agribusiness, through ICONE, for much of the highly technical work needed for the Doha 
negotiations.[15] The government created an informal technical working group immediately 
after ICONE was founded.[16] The group was coordinated by Itamaraty and included all of the 
key government ministries (including MAPA and MDA), as well as ICONE, the national lobby 
group of the commercial farm sector (CNA), and the national association representing small 
farmers and agricultural workers (CONTAG). The intent was to include all relevant stakeholders 
and interests in the group, in order to increase its legitimacy. However, MDA and CONTAG 
were hampered by their lack of experience with trade issues and limited technical knowledge of 
the WTO and were less active and influential participants, particularly in the early stages when 
Brazil’s negotiating position was being hammered out. Consequently, the real players in the 
group were Itamaraty, MAPA and ICONE. The group had no official role in decision-making 
and produced no official documents; concerned about the optics of working so closely with 
agribusiness, Itamaraty intentionally kept the group informal – “off the books” – such that it was 
never even given an official name. But it was here that Brazil’s negotiating position, and 
ultimately most of the negotiating proposals put forward by the G20, originated. 
The informal group functioned as a technical working group at the officials level, with 
participants engaged in marking up and drafting proposals together. During some periods, it met 
as frequently as every week, working for days at a time. ICONE played a central role: it 
generated the majority of the technical work, providing technical studies of domestic and export 
subsidies, tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and other issues in the negotiations; running econometric 
analyses of the impact of different tariff and subsidy reduction proposals; and generating 
proposals that were given to Brazilian negotiators and from there to the G20. Between 2003-
2007, ICONE prepared 62 confidential technical papers and simulations for the Brazilian 
government (ICONE, 2007). ICONE’s analyses were instrumental in the development of 
Brazil’s, and consequently the G20’s, negotiating positions. Detailed negotiating proposals based 
on the work of ICONE were formulated in the internal working group; Brazil would then take 
them to the G20 membership, where they would be modified slightly and subsequently presented 
to the WTO as the official G20 position. ICONE also had an active presence directly in Geneva: 
it attended G20 meetings and strategy sessions and accompanied the Brazilian negotiating team 
to formal meetings and negotiating sessions at the WTO.[17] The G20 has had a significant 
impact on the Doha Round, altering the dynamic and agenda of the negotiations. Through its 
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leadership of the G20, Brazil broke the US and EU’s lock on decision-making and agenda-
setting at the WTO and launched itself into the elite inner circle of negotiations as a key player in 
the Doha Round (Hopewell, 2013). Brazil and its agribusiness sector successfully made US and 
EU agricultural subsidies a central target of the round and the draft negotiating texts since the 
establishment of the G20 have substantively reflected many of its proposals. Specifically, the 
G20 has secured: a tiered formula for reducing subsidies (“domestic support”), ensuring that 
countries that provide the most support are required to make the biggest reductions, and stiffer 
criteria for cutting domestic support, such as product-specific caps; substantial reductions in 
domestic support (compared to historical bound levels), with the EU cutting overall trade 
distorting support (OTDS) by 80 percent and the US by 70 percent; the elimination of export 
subsidies and parallel disciplines on export credit and food aid; non-extension of the Peace 
Clause (protecting developed countries from WTO challenges), countering the long-standing 
position of the US and EU; and a “tiered” formula for reducing tariffs, rather than the “blended” 
formula sought by the US and EU (WTO, 2008). Although the final outcome of the Doha Round 
remains uncertain, the G20 – driven by Brazil and its agribusiness sector – significantly shaped 
the content of any prospective agreement.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that in the intervening decades since the theory of dependent development was 
first formulated, state-business relations in Brazil have been radically transformed, driven by 
changes in both the global political economy and the domestic polity. Under earlier conditions of 
dependent development, Brazil was dependent on investment by foreign multinationals seeking 
access to the domestic market to fuel economic growth and development. However, in the last 
two decades, the emergence of a highly-competitive export-oriented agribusiness sector in Brazil 
prompted the expansion and internationalization of domestic capital. Rather than being a weak 
entity – subjugated to a strong state, or playing second fiddle to foreign capital – local capital has 
instead become a key source of growth and dynamism in the Brazilian economy. Brazilian 
agribusiness has emerged as a powerful and independent private sector lobby with considerable 
influence on the Brazilian state. Driven by the rise of the agribusiness sector, the state and capital 
allied together to aggressively pursue the expansion of markets for Brazilian exports, specifically 
through dispute settlement and negotiations at the WTO.  
While the current study has been limited to the Brazilian case, there is reason to believe that 
similar transformations may be taking place in at least some of the other emerging economies. In 
India, for example, a globally-competitive, export-oriented information technology (IT) and IT-
enabled services (ITES) sector has emerged in the last two decades, centered on business process 
outsourcing (BPO) (including software development, call centers, payroll and accounting 
services, radiology and medical transcription, financial industry research and analysis, legal 
research and writing, and product research and development). The IT and ITES sector has 
become one of the most cutting-edge and best-performing sectors of the Indian economy and a 
major source of exports and foreign exchange (Hoekman and Mattoo, 2007; Chanda and 
Sasidaran, 2007). The sector is centered on domestic firms and, like Brazilian agribusiness, as 
they developed they bypassed old industry associations and corporatist structures in order to 
form a new and independent lobby, the National Association of Software and Services 
Companies (NASSCOM) to represent their interests vis-à-vis the state and exert influence on 
trade and economic policy. As with Brazil, driven by the rise of the Indian IT services sector, the 
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state and national capital have allied together to project their export interests abroad. Most 
recently, in response to new US visa rules that would restrict the ability of Indian outsourcing 
firms to bring Indian software engineers and other skilled IT workers to supply services in the 
US, industry and the state have been working together to engage in behind-the-scenes 
negotiations with legislators in US Congress, as well as threatening to launch a formal trade 
dispute at the WTO.[18] There thus appear to be notable similarities between the Brazilian and 
Indian cases.  
China, however, the most prominent of the large emerging economies, seems to present a 
markedly different case. All three countries have experienced the emergence of a highly-
competitive sector oriented towards global markets – Brazil in agriculture, India in services, and 
China in manufacturing – driving a dramatic expansion of exports and a reorientation of their 
economies. Yet in contrast to both Brazil and India, China is a strong authoritarian state, with 
state-business relations closely intertwined and the arms of the state extending deeply into the 
private sector. The boundaries between the state and domestic capital are far less distinct in 
China, and there appears to be little sign of an independent business lobby emerging to exert 
influence on the state (in the realm of trade or elsewhere), as we have seen in Brazil.[19] The 
apparent similarities and differences among these three cases point to the value of future 
comparative research analyzing contemporary transformations in state-business relations in the 
emerging economies.  
 
Notes 
[1] Interview, Geneva, March 2009. 
[2] Data from EIU (2010). 
[3] Interviews with government officials, industry representatives, civil society and media in 
Brazil, May 2010. 
[4] Both examples were co-authored by representatives of ICONE and Brazilian negotiators at its 
mission to the WTO. 
[5] Interview, May 2009. 
[6] Interviews with Brazilian officials, May 2009. 
[7] This was the consensus view among Brazilian policymakers interviewed, even those in 
MDA.  
[8] Interview with Brazilian negotiator, Geneva, March 2009. 
[9] Interviews with Brazilian negotiators and officials, September 2008-June 2009 and May 
2010. 
[10] Interviews with WTO negotiators and officials, September 2008-June 2009. 
[11] Interview with Brazilian observer, May 2010. 
[12] Interviews with Brazilian officials and industry representatives, May 2010. 
[13] Interviews with WTO negotiators, Geneva, September 2008-June 2009. 
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[14] ICONE’s sponsors and advisory board consist of: ABIOVE (Brazilian Association of 
Vegetable Oil Industries), ABIPECS (Brazilian Pork Industry and Exporter Association), ABIEC 
(Brazilian Meat Industry and Exporter Association), ABEF (Brazilian Poultry Industry and 
Exporters Association), UNICA (Brazilian Sugar Cane Industry Union), ABAG (Brazilian 
Agribusiness Association), FIESP (Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo), IRGA 
(Rice Institute of Rio Grande do Sul). 
[15] Interviews with Brazilian officials, September 2008-June 2009 and May 2010. 
[16] Interviews with Brazilian officials, September 2008-June 2009 and May 2010. 
[17] Interviews with Brazilian officials, September 2008-June 2009 and May 2010. 
[18] Interviews with Indian services industry representatives and government officials, New 
Delhi, March 2010. 
[19] Interviews with Chinese officials, Beijing, July-August 2009. 
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